{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }: with lib; let luks = config.boot.initrd.luks; openCommand = { name, device, keyFile, keyFileSize, allowDiscards, yubikey, ... }: '' # Wait for luksRoot to appear, e.g. if on a usb drive. # XXX: copied and adapted from stage-1-init.sh - should be # available as a function. if ! test -e ${device}; then echo -n "waiting 10 seconds for device ${device} to appear..." for try in $(seq 10); do sleep 1 if test -e ${device}; then break; fi echo -n . done echo "ok" fi ${optionalString (keyFile != null) '' if ! test -e ${keyFile}; then echo -n "waiting 10 seconds for key file ${keyFile} to appear..." for try in $(seq 10); do sleep 1 if test -e ${keyFile}; then break; fi echo -n . done echo "ok" fi ''} open_normally() { cryptsetup luksOpen ${device} ${name} ${optionalString allowDiscards "--allow-discards"} \ ${optionalString (keyFile != null) "--key-file=${keyFile} ${optionalString (keyFileSize != null) "--keyfile-size=${toString keyFileSize}"}"} } ${optionalString (luks.yubikeySupport && (yubikey != null)) '' rbtohex() { ( od -An -vtx1 | tr -d ' \n' ) } hextorb() { ( tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]' | sed -e 's/\([0-9A-F]\{2\}\)/\\\\\\x\1/gI' | xargs printf ) } open_yubikey() { # Make all of these local to this function # to prevent their values being leaked local salt local iterations local k_user local challenge local response local k_luks local opened local new_salt local new_iterations local new_challenge local new_response local new_k_luks mkdir -p ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint} mount -t ${yubikey.storage.fsType} ${toString yubikey.storage.device} ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint} salt="$(cat ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint}${yubikey.storage.path} | sed -n 1p | tr -d '\n')" iterations="$(cat ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint}${yubikey.storage.path} | sed -n 2p | tr -d '\n')" challenge="$(echo -n $salt | openssl-wrap dgst -binary -sha512 | rbtohex)" response="$(ykchalresp -${toString yubikey.slot} -x $challenge 2>/dev/null)" for try in $(seq 3); do ${optionalString yubikey.twoFactor '' echo -n "Enter two-factor passphrase: " read -s k_user echo ''} if [ ! -z "$k_user" ]; then k_luks="$(echo -n $k_user | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $iterations $response | rbtohex)" else k_luks="$(echo | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $iterations $response | rbtohex)" fi echo -n "$k_luks" | hextorb | cryptsetup luksOpen ${device} ${name} ${optionalString allowDiscards "--allow-discards"} --key-file=- if [ $? == "0" ]; then opened=true break else opened=false echo "Authentication failed!" fi done if [ "$opened" == false ]; then umount ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint} echo "Maximum authentication errors reached" exit 1 fi echo -n "Gathering entropy for new salt (please enter random keys to generate entropy if this blocks for long)..." for i in $(seq ${toString yubikey.saltLength}); do byte="$(dd if=/dev/random bs=1 count=1 2>/dev/null | rbtohex)"; new_salt="$new_salt$byte"; echo -n . done; echo "ok" new_iterations="$iterations" ${optionalString (yubikey.iterationStep > 0) '' new_iterations="$(($new_iterations + ${toString yubikey.iterationStep}))" ''} new_challenge="$(echo -n $new_salt | openssl-wrap dgst -binary -sha512 | rbtohex)" new_response="$(ykchalresp -${toString yubikey.slot} -x $new_challenge 2>/dev/null)" if [ ! -z "$k_user" ]; then new_k_luks="$(echo -n $k_user | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $new_iterations $new_response | rbtohex)" else new_k_luks="$(echo | pbkdf2-sha512 ${toString yubikey.keyLength} $new_iterations $new_response | rbtohex)" fi mkdir -p ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint} # A ramfs is used here to ensure that the file used to update # the key slot with cryptsetup will never get swapped out. # Warning: Do NOT replace with tmpfs! mount -t ramfs none ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint} echo -n "$new_k_luks" | hextorb > ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint}/new_key echo -n "$k_luks" | hextorb | cryptsetup luksChangeKey ${device} --key-file=- ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint}/new_key if [ $? == "0" ]; then echo -ne "$new_salt\n$new_iterations" > ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint}${yubikey.storage.path} else echo "Warning: Could not update LUKS key, current challenge persists!" fi rm -f ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint}/new_key umount ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint} rm -rf ${yubikey.ramfsMountPoint} umount ${yubikey.storage.mountPoint} } ${optionalString (yubikey.gracePeriod > 0) '' echo -n "Waiting ${toString yubikey.gracePeriod} seconds as grace..." for i in $(seq ${toString yubikey.gracePeriod}); do sleep 1 echo -n . done echo "ok" ''} yubikey_missing=true ykinfo -v 1>/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? != "0" ]; then echo -n "waiting 10 seconds for yubikey to appear..." for try in $(seq 10); do sleep 1 ykinfo -v 1>/dev/null 2>&1 if [ $? == "0" ]; then yubikey_missing=false break fi echo -n . done echo "ok" else yubikey_missing=false fi if [ "$yubikey_missing" == true ]; then echo "no yubikey found, falling back to non-yubikey open procedure" open_normally else open_yubikey fi ''} # open luksRoot and scan for logical volumes ${optionalString ((!luks.yubikeySupport) || (yubikey == null)) '' open_normally ''} ''; isPreLVM = f: f.preLVM; preLVM = filter isPreLVM luks.devices; postLVM = filter (f: !(isPreLVM f)) luks.devices; in { options = { boot.initrd.luks.mitigateDMAAttacks = mkOption { type = types.bool; default = true; description = '' Unless enabled, encryption keys can be easily recovered by an attacker with physical access to any machine with PCMCIA, ExpressCard, ThunderBolt or FireWire port. More information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DMA_attack This option blacklists FireWire drivers, but doesn't remove them. You can manually load the drivers if you need to use a FireWire device, but don't forget to unload them! ''; }; boot.initrd.luks.cryptoModules = mkOption { type = types.listOf types.string; default = [ "aes" "aes_generic" "blowfish" "twofish" "serpent" "cbc" "xts" "lrw" "sha1" "sha256" "sha512" (if pkgs.stdenv.system == "x86_64-linux" then "aes_x86_64" else "aes_i586") ]; description = '' A list of cryptographic kernel modules needed to decrypt the root device(s). The default includes all common modules. ''; }; boot.initrd.luks.devices = mkOption { default = [ ]; example = [ { name = "luksroot"; device = "/dev/sda3"; preLVM = true; } ]; description = '' The list of devices that should be decrypted using LUKS before trying to mount the root partition. This works for both LVM-over-LUKS and LUKS-over-LVM setups. The devices are decrypted to the device mapper names defined. Make sure that initrd has the crypto modules needed for decryption. ''; type = types.listOf types.optionSet; options = { name = mkOption { example = "luksroot"; type = types.string; description = "Named to be used for the generated device in /dev/mapper."; }; device = mkOption { example = "/dev/sda2"; type = types.string; description = "Path of the underlying block device."; }; keyFile = mkOption { default = null; example = "/dev/sdb1"; type = types.nullOr types.string; description = '' The name of the file (can be a raw device or a partition) that should be used as the decryption key for the encrypted device. If not specified, you will be prompted for a passphrase instead. ''; }; keyFileSize = mkOption { default = null; example = 4096; type = types.nullOr types.int; description = '' The size of the key file. Use this if only the beginning of the key file should be used as a key (often the case if a raw device or partition is used as key file). If not specified, the whole keyFile will be used decryption, instead of just the first keyFileSize bytes. ''; }; preLVM = mkOption { default = true; type = types.bool; description = "Whether the luksOpen will be attempted before LVM scan or after it."; }; allowDiscards = mkOption { default = false; type = types.bool; description = '' Whether to allow TRIM requests to the underlying device. This option has security implications, please read the LUKS documentation before activating in. ''; }; yubikey = mkOption { default = null; type = types.nullOr types.optionSet; description = '' The options to use for this LUKS device in Yubikey-PBA. If null (the default), Yubikey-PBA will be disabled for this device. ''; options = { twoFactor = mkOption { default = true; type = types.bool; description = "Whether to use a passphrase and a Yubikey (true), or only a Yubikey (false)"; }; slot = mkOption { default = 2; type = types.int; description = "Which slot on the Yubikey to challenge"; }; saltLength = mkOption { default = 16; type = types.int; description = "Length of the new salt in byte (64 is the effective maximum)"; }; keyLength = mkOption { default = 64; type = types.int; description = "Length of the LUKS slot key derived with PBKDF2 in byte"; }; iterationStep = mkOption { default = 0; type = types.int; description = "How much the iteration count for PBKDF2 is increased at each successful authentication"; }; gracePeriod = mkOption { default = 2; type = types.int; description = "Time in seconds to wait before attempting to find the Yubikey"; }; ramfsMountPoint = mkOption { default = "/crypt-ramfs"; type = types.string; description = "Path where the ramfs used to update the LUKS key will be mounted in stage-1"; }; storage = mkOption { type = types.optionSet; description = "Options related to the storing the salt"; options = { device = mkOption { default = /dev/sda1; type = types.path; description = '' An unencrypted device that will temporarily be mounted in stage-1. Must contain the current salt to create the challenge for this LUKS device. ''; }; fsType = mkOption { default = "vfat"; type = types.string; description = "The filesystem of the unencrypted device"; }; mountPoint = mkOption { default = "/crypt-storage"; type = types.string; description = "Path where the unencrypted device will be mounted in stage-1"; }; path = mkOption { default = "/crypt-storage/default"; type = types.string; description = '' Absolute path of the salt on the unencrypted device with that device's root directory as "/". ''; }; }; }; }; }; }; }; boot.initrd.luks.yubikeySupport = mkOption { default = false; type = types.bool; description = '' Enables support for authenticating with a Yubikey on LUKS devices. See the NixOS wiki for information on how to properly setup a LUKS device and a Yubikey to work with this feature. ''; }; }; config = mkIf (luks.devices != []) { # actually, sbp2 driver is the one enabling the DMA attack, but this needs to be tested boot.blacklistedKernelModules = optionals luks.mitigateDMAAttacks ["firewire_ohci" "firewire_core" "firewire_sbp2"]; # Some modules that may be needed for mounting anything ciphered boot.initrd.availableKernelModules = [ "dm_mod" "dm_crypt" "cryptd" ] ++ luks.cryptoModules; # copy the cryptsetup binary and it's dependencies boot.initrd.extraUtilsCommands = '' cp -pdv ${pkgs.cryptsetup}/sbin/cryptsetup $out/bin cp -pdv ${pkgs.libgcrypt}/lib/libgcrypt*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.libgpgerror}/lib/libgpg-error*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.cryptsetup}/lib/libcryptsetup*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.popt}/lib/libpopt*.so.* $out/lib ${optionalString luks.yubikeySupport '' cp -pdv ${pkgs.ykpers}/bin/ykchalresp $out/bin cp -pdv ${pkgs.ykpers}/bin/ykinfo $out/bin cp -pdv ${pkgs.openssl}/bin/openssl $out/bin cc -O3 -I${pkgs.openssl}/include -L${pkgs.openssl}/lib ${./pbkdf2-sha512.c} -o $out/bin/pbkdf2-sha512 -lcrypto strip -s $out/bin/pbkdf2-sha512 cp -pdv ${pkgs.libusb1}/lib/libusb*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.ykpers}/lib/libykpers*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.libyubikey}/lib/libyubikey*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.openssl}/lib/libssl*.so.* $out/lib cp -pdv ${pkgs.openssl}/lib/libcrypto*.so.* $out/lib mkdir -p $out/etc/ssl cp -pdv ${pkgs.openssl}/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf $out/etc/ssl cat > $out/bin/openssl-wrap < $out/bin/openssl-wrap <