Type: feature Currently, if a handshake message is sent and a cookie message is received in reply, the cookie message will be ignored. Thus, further handshake messages will not have valid mac2 and handshake will not be able to be completed. With this change, process received cookie messages to be able to calculate mac2 for further handshake messages sent. Cover this with tests. Signed-off-by: Alexander Chernavin <achernavin@netgate.com> Change-Id: I6d51459778b7145be7077badec479b2aa85960b9
761 lines
22 KiB
C
761 lines
22 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 2020 Doc.ai and/or its affiliates.
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* Copyright (c) 2015-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>.
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* Copyright (c) 2019-2020 Matt Dunwoodie <ncon@noconroy.net>.
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at:
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <wireguard/wireguard.h>
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#include <wireguard/wireguard_chachapoly.h>
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/* This implements Noise_IKpsk2:
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*
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* <- s
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* ******
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* -> e, es, s, ss, {t}
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* <- e, ee, se, psk, {}
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*/
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noise_local_t *noise_local_pool;
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/* Private functions */
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static noise_keypair_t *noise_remote_keypair_allocate (noise_remote_t *);
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static void noise_remote_keypair_free (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t *,
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noise_keypair_t **);
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static uint32_t noise_remote_handshake_index_get (noise_remote_t *);
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static void noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (noise_remote_t *);
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static uint64_t noise_counter_send (noise_counter_t *);
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bool noise_counter_recv (noise_counter_t *, uint64_t);
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static void noise_kdf (uint8_t *, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, const uint8_t *,
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size_t, size_t, size_t, size_t,
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const uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
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static bool noise_mix_dh (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
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const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
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static bool noise_mix_ss (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
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const uint8_t ss[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
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static void noise_mix_hash (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t *, size_t);
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static void noise_mix_psk (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
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const uint8_t[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN]);
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static void noise_param_init (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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const uint8_t[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
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static void noise_msg_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
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uint32_t key_idx, uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
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static bool noise_msg_decrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t *, uint8_t *, size_t,
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uint32_t key_idx, uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN]);
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static void noise_msg_ephemeral (uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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uint8_t[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
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const uint8_t src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN]);
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static void noise_tai64n_now (uint8_t[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN]);
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/* Set/Get noise parameters */
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void
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noise_local_init (noise_local_t * l, struct noise_upcall *upcall)
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{
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clib_memset (l, 0, sizeof (*l));
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l->l_upcall = *upcall;
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}
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bool
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noise_local_set_private (noise_local_t * l,
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const uint8_t private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
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{
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clib_memcpy (l->l_private, private, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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return curve25519_gen_public (l->l_public, private);
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}
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void
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noise_remote_init (noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t peer_pool_idx,
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const uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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u32 noise_local_idx)
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{
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clib_memset (r, 0, sizeof (*r));
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clib_memcpy (r->r_public, public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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clib_rwlock_init (&r->r_keypair_lock);
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r->r_peer_idx = peer_pool_idx;
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r->r_local_idx = noise_local_idx;
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r->r_handshake.hs_state = HS_ZEROED;
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noise_remote_precompute (r);
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}
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void
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noise_remote_precompute (noise_remote_t * r)
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{
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noise_local_t *l = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx);
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if (!curve25519_gen_shared (r->r_ss, l->l_private, r->r_public))
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clib_memset (r->r_ss, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
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wg_secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
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}
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/* Handshake functions */
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bool
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noise_create_initiation (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r,
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uint32_t * s_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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uint8_t es[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN],
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uint8_t ets[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
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{
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noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
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noise_local_t *l = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx);
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uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint32_t key_idx;
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uint8_t *key;
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int ret = false;
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key_idx =
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vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
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noise_param_init (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, r->r_public);
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/* e */
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curve25519_gen_secret (hs->hs_e);
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if (!curve25519_gen_public (ue, hs->hs_e))
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goto error;
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noise_msg_ephemeral (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, ue);
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/* es */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, key, hs->hs_e, r->r_public))
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goto error;
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/* s */
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noise_msg_encrypt (vm, es, l->l_public, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, key_idx,
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hs->hs_hash);
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/* ss */
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if (!noise_mix_ss (hs->hs_ck, key, r->r_ss))
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goto error;
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/* {t} */
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noise_tai64n_now (ets);
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noise_msg_encrypt (vm, ets, ets, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN, key_idx, hs->hs_hash);
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noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
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hs->hs_state = CREATED_INITIATION;
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hs->hs_local_index = noise_remote_handshake_index_get (r);
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*s_idx = hs->hs_local_index;
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ret = true;
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error:
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wg_secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
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return ret;
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}
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bool
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noise_consume_initiation (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_local_t * l,
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noise_remote_t ** rp, uint32_t s_idx,
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uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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uint8_t es[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN +
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NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN],
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uint8_t ets[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN +
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NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
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{
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noise_remote_t *r;
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noise_handshake_t hs;
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uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint8_t r_public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint8_t timestamp[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN] = { 0 };
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u32 key_idx;
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uint8_t *key;
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int ret = false;
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key_idx =
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vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
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noise_param_init (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, l->l_public);
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/* e */
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noise_msg_ephemeral (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, ue);
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/* es */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, key, l->l_private, ue))
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goto error;
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/* s */
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if (!noise_msg_decrypt (vm, r_public, es,
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NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx,
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hs.hs_hash))
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goto error;
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/* Lookup the remote we received from */
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if ((r = l->l_upcall.u_remote_get (r_public)) == NULL)
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goto error;
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/* ss */
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if (!noise_mix_ss (hs.hs_ck, key, r->r_ss))
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goto error;
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/* {t} */
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if (!noise_msg_decrypt (vm, timestamp, ets,
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NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx,
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hs.hs_hash))
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goto error;
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;
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hs.hs_state = CONSUMED_INITIATION;
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hs.hs_local_index = 0;
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hs.hs_remote_index = s_idx;
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clib_memcpy (hs.hs_e, ue, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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/* Replay */
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if (clib_memcmp (timestamp, r->r_timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN) > 0)
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clib_memcpy (r->r_timestamp, timestamp, NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
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else
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goto error;
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/* Flood attack */
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if (wg_birthdate_has_expired (r->r_last_init, REJECT_INTERVAL))
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r->r_last_init = vlib_time_now (vm);
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else
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goto error;
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/* Ok, we're happy to accept this initiation now */
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noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
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r->r_handshake = hs;
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*rp = r;
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ret = true;
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error:
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wg_secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
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wg_secure_zero_memory (&hs, sizeof (hs));
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return ret;
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}
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bool
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noise_create_response (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t * s_idx,
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uint32_t * r_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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uint8_t en[0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
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{
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noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
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uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint8_t e[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint32_t key_idx;
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uint8_t *key;
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int ret = false;
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key_idx =
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vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
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if (hs->hs_state != CONSUMED_INITIATION)
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goto error;
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/* e */
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curve25519_gen_secret (e);
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if (!curve25519_gen_public (ue, e))
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goto error;
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noise_msg_ephemeral (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, ue);
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/* ee */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, NULL, e, hs->hs_e))
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goto error;
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/* se */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs->hs_ck, NULL, e, r->r_public))
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goto error;
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/* psk */
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noise_mix_psk (hs->hs_ck, hs->hs_hash, key, r->r_psk);
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/* {} */
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noise_msg_encrypt (vm, en, NULL, 0, key_idx, hs->hs_hash);
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hs->hs_state = CREATED_RESPONSE;
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hs->hs_local_index = noise_remote_handshake_index_get (r);
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*r_idx = hs->hs_remote_index;
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*s_idx = hs->hs_local_index;
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ret = true;
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error:
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wg_secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
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wg_secure_zero_memory (e, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
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return ret;
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}
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bool
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noise_consume_response (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t s_idx,
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uint32_t r_idx, uint8_t ue[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
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uint8_t en[0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN])
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{
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noise_local_t *l = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx);
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noise_handshake_t hs;
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uint8_t _key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint8_t preshared_key[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN] = { 0 };
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uint32_t key_idx;
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uint8_t *key;
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int ret = false;
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key_idx =
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vnet_crypto_key_add (vm, VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305, _key,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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key = vnet_crypto_get_key (key_idx)->data;
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hs = r->r_handshake;
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clib_memcpy (preshared_key, r->r_psk, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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if (hs.hs_state != CREATED_INITIATION || hs.hs_local_index != r_idx)
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goto error;
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/* e */
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noise_msg_ephemeral (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, ue);
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/* ee */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, NULL, hs.hs_e, ue))
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goto error;
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/* se */
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if (!noise_mix_dh (hs.hs_ck, NULL, l->l_private, ue))
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goto error;
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/* psk */
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noise_mix_psk (hs.hs_ck, hs.hs_hash, key, preshared_key);
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/* {} */
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if (!noise_msg_decrypt
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(vm, NULL, en, 0 + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN, key_idx, hs.hs_hash))
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goto error;
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hs.hs_remote_index = s_idx;
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if (r->r_handshake.hs_state == hs.hs_state &&
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r->r_handshake.hs_local_index == hs.hs_local_index)
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{
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r->r_handshake = hs;
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r->r_handshake.hs_state = CONSUMED_RESPONSE;
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ret = true;
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}
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error:
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wg_secure_zero_memory (&hs, sizeof (hs));
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wg_secure_zero_memory (key, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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vnet_crypto_key_del (vm, key_idx);
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return ret;
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}
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bool
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noise_remote_begin_session (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r)
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{
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noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
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noise_keypair_t kp, *next, *current, *previous;
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uint8_t key_send[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
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uint8_t key_recv[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN];
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/* We now derive the keypair from the handshake */
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if (hs->hs_state == CONSUMED_RESPONSE)
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{
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kp.kp_is_initiator = 1;
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noise_kdf (key_send, key_recv, NULL, NULL,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
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hs->hs_ck);
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}
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else if (hs->hs_state == CREATED_RESPONSE)
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{
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kp.kp_is_initiator = 0;
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noise_kdf (key_recv, key_send, NULL, NULL,
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NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, 0,
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hs->hs_ck);
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}
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else
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{
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return false;
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}
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kp.kp_valid = 1;
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kp.kp_send_index = vnet_crypto_key_add (vm,
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VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
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key_send, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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kp.kp_recv_index = vnet_crypto_key_add (vm,
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VNET_CRYPTO_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
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key_recv, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN);
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kp.kp_local_index = hs->hs_local_index;
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kp.kp_remote_index = hs->hs_remote_index;
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kp.kp_birthdate = vlib_time_now (vm);
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clib_memset (&kp.kp_ctr, 0, sizeof (kp.kp_ctr));
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/* Now we need to add_new_keypair */
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clib_rwlock_writer_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
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/* Activate barrier to synchronization keys between threads */
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vlib_worker_thread_barrier_sync (vm);
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next = r->r_next;
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current = r->r_current;
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previous = r->r_previous;
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if (kp.kp_is_initiator)
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{
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if (next != NULL)
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{
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r->r_next = NULL;
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r->r_previous = next;
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noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, ¤t);
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}
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else
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{
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r->r_previous = current;
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}
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noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &previous);
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r->r_current = noise_remote_keypair_allocate (r);
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*r->r_current = kp;
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}
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else
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{
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noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &next);
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r->r_previous = NULL;
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noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &previous);
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r->r_next = noise_remote_keypair_allocate (r);
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*r->r_next = kp;
|
|
}
|
|
vlib_worker_thread_barrier_release (vm);
|
|
clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
|
|
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (&kp, sizeof (kp));
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
noise_remote_clear (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (r);
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (&r->r_handshake, sizeof (r->r_handshake));
|
|
|
|
clib_rwlock_writer_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_next);
|
|
noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_current);
|
|
noise_remote_keypair_free (vm, r, &r->r_previous);
|
|
r->r_next = NULL;
|
|
r->r_current = NULL;
|
|
r->r_previous = NULL;
|
|
clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
noise_remote_expire_current (noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
clib_rwlock_writer_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
if (r->r_next != NULL)
|
|
r->r_next->kp_valid = 0;
|
|
if (r->r_current != NULL)
|
|
r->r_current->kp_valid = 0;
|
|
clib_rwlock_writer_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
noise_remote_ready (noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_keypair_t *kp;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
clib_rwlock_reader_lock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
if ((kp = r->r_current) == NULL ||
|
|
!kp->kp_valid ||
|
|
wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
|
|
kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
|
|
kp->kp_ctr.c_send >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES)
|
|
ret = false;
|
|
else
|
|
ret = true;
|
|
clib_rwlock_reader_unlock (&r->r_keypair_lock);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enum noise_state_crypt
|
|
noise_remote_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, noise_remote_t * r, uint32_t * r_idx,
|
|
uint64_t * nonce, uint8_t * src, size_t srclen,
|
|
uint8_t * dst)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_keypair_t *kp;
|
|
enum noise_state_crypt ret = SC_FAILED;
|
|
|
|
if ((kp = r->r_current) == NULL)
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* We confirm that our values are within our tolerances. We want:
|
|
* - a valid keypair
|
|
* - our keypair to be less than REJECT_AFTER_TIME seconds old
|
|
* - our receive counter to be less than REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES
|
|
* - our send counter to be less than REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!kp->kp_valid ||
|
|
wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REJECT_AFTER_TIME) ||
|
|
kp->kp_ctr.c_recv >= REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES ||
|
|
((*nonce = noise_counter_send (&kp->kp_ctr)) > REJECT_AFTER_MESSAGES))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
/* We encrypt into the same buffer, so the caller must ensure that buf
|
|
* has NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN bytes to store the MAC. The nonce and index
|
|
* are passed back out to the caller through the provided data pointer. */
|
|
*r_idx = kp->kp_remote_index;
|
|
|
|
wg_chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, srclen, dst, NULL, 0, *nonce,
|
|
VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC,
|
|
kp->kp_send_index);
|
|
|
|
/* If our values are still within tolerances, but we are approaching
|
|
* the tolerances, we notify the caller with ESTALE that they should
|
|
* establish a new keypair. The current keypair can continue to be used
|
|
* until the tolerances are hit. We notify if:
|
|
* - our send counter is valid and not less than REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES
|
|
* - we're the initiator and our keypair is older than
|
|
* REKEY_AFTER_TIME seconds */
|
|
ret = SC_KEEP_KEY_FRESH;
|
|
if ((kp->kp_valid && *nonce >= REKEY_AFTER_MESSAGES) ||
|
|
(kp->kp_is_initiator &&
|
|
wg_birthdate_has_expired (kp->kp_birthdate, REKEY_AFTER_TIME)))
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
ret = SC_OK;
|
|
error:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Private functions - these should not be called outside this file under any
|
|
* circumstances. */
|
|
static noise_keypair_t *
|
|
noise_remote_keypair_allocate (noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_keypair_t *kp;
|
|
kp = clib_mem_alloc (sizeof (*kp));
|
|
return kp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static uint32_t
|
|
noise_remote_handshake_index_get (noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_local_t *local = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx);
|
|
struct noise_upcall *u = &local->l_upcall;
|
|
return u->u_index_set (r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_remote_handshake_index_drop (noise_remote_t * r)
|
|
{
|
|
noise_handshake_t *hs = &r->r_handshake;
|
|
noise_local_t *local = noise_local_get (r->r_local_idx);
|
|
struct noise_upcall *u = &local->l_upcall;
|
|
if (hs->hs_state != HS_ZEROED)
|
|
u->u_index_drop (hs->hs_local_index);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_kdf (uint8_t * a, uint8_t * b, uint8_t * c, const uint8_t * x,
|
|
size_t a_len, size_t b_len, size_t c_len, size_t x_len,
|
|
const uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1];
|
|
uint8_t sec[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
/* Extract entropy from "x" into sec */
|
|
u32 l = 0;
|
|
HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN, x, x_len, sec, &l);
|
|
ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
if (a == NULL || a_len == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Expand first key: key = sec, data = 0x1 */
|
|
out[0] = 1;
|
|
HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, 1, out, &l);
|
|
ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
clib_memcpy (a, out, a_len);
|
|
|
|
if (b == NULL || b_len == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Expand second key: key = sec, data = "a" || 0x2 */
|
|
out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
|
|
HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
|
|
out, &l);
|
|
ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
clib_memcpy (b, out, b_len);
|
|
|
|
if (c == NULL || c_len == 0)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Expand third key: key = sec, data = "b" || 0x3 */
|
|
out[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
|
|
HMAC (EVP_blake2s256 (), sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
|
|
out, &l);
|
|
ASSERT (l == BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
clib_memcpy (c, out, c_len);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
/* Clear sensitive data from stack */
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (sec, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (out, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
noise_mix_dh (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
|
|
uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t private[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t public[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t dh[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
|
|
if (!curve25519_gen_shared (dh, private, public))
|
|
return false;
|
|
noise_kdf (ck, key, NULL, dh,
|
|
NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
|
|
ck);
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (dh, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
noise_mix_ss (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
|
|
uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t ss[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
static uint8_t null_point[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN];
|
|
if (clib_memcmp (ss, null_point, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) == 0)
|
|
return false;
|
|
noise_kdf (ck, key, NULL, ss,
|
|
NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, 0, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN,
|
|
ck);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_mix_hash (uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN], const uint8_t * src,
|
|
size_t src_len)
|
|
{
|
|
blake2s_state_t blake;
|
|
|
|
blake2s_init (&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
blake2s_update (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
blake2s_update (&blake, src, src_len);
|
|
blake2s_final (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_mix_psk (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
|
|
uint8_t key[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t psk[NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t tmp[NOISE_HASH_LEN];
|
|
|
|
noise_kdf (ck, tmp, key, psk,
|
|
NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_HASH_LEN, NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN,
|
|
NOISE_SYMMETRIC_KEY_LEN, ck);
|
|
noise_mix_hash (hash, tmp, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
wg_secure_zero_memory (tmp, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_param_init (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t s[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
blake2s_state_t blake;
|
|
|
|
blake2s (ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN, (uint8_t *) NOISE_HANDSHAKE_NAME,
|
|
strlen (NOISE_HANDSHAKE_NAME), NULL, 0);
|
|
|
|
blake2s_init (&blake, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
blake2s_update (&blake, ck, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
blake2s_update (&blake, (uint8_t *) NOISE_IDENTIFIER_NAME,
|
|
strlen (NOISE_IDENTIFIER_NAME));
|
|
blake2s_final (&blake, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
|
|
|
|
noise_mix_hash (hash, s, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_msg_encrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t * dst, uint8_t * src,
|
|
size_t src_len, uint32_t key_idx,
|
|
uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
/* Nonce always zero for Noise_IK */
|
|
wg_chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, src_len, dst, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0,
|
|
VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_ENC, key_idx);
|
|
noise_mix_hash (hash, dst, src_len + NOISE_AUTHTAG_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
noise_msg_decrypt (vlib_main_t * vm, uint8_t * dst, uint8_t * src,
|
|
size_t src_len, uint32_t key_idx,
|
|
uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
/* Nonce always zero for Noise_IK */
|
|
if (!wg_chacha20poly1305_calc (vm, src, src_len, dst, hash, NOISE_HASH_LEN,
|
|
0, VNET_CRYPTO_OP_CHACHA20_POLY1305_DEC,
|
|
key_idx))
|
|
return false;
|
|
noise_mix_hash (hash, src, src_len);
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_msg_ephemeral (uint8_t ck[NOISE_HASH_LEN], uint8_t hash[NOISE_HASH_LEN],
|
|
const uint8_t src[NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
noise_mix_hash (hash, src, NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
|
|
noise_kdf (ck, NULL, NULL, src, NOISE_HASH_LEN, 0, 0,
|
|
NOISE_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN, ck);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
noise_tai64n_now (uint8_t output[NOISE_TIMESTAMP_LEN])
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t unix_sec;
|
|
uint32_t unix_nanosec;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t sec;
|
|
uint32_t nsec;
|
|
|
|
unix_time_now_nsec_fraction (&unix_sec, &unix_nanosec);
|
|
|
|
/* Round down the nsec counter to limit precise timing leak. */
|
|
unix_nanosec &= REJECT_INTERVAL_MASK;
|
|
|
|
/* https://cr.yp.to/libtai/tai64.html */
|
|
sec = htobe64 (0x400000000000000aULL + unix_sec);
|
|
nsec = htobe32 (unix_nanosec);
|
|
|
|
/* memcpy to output buffer, assuming output could be unaligned. */
|
|
clib_memcpy (output, &sec, sizeof (sec));
|
|
clib_memcpy (output + sizeof (sec), &nsec, sizeof (nsec));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* fd.io coding-style-patch-verification: ON
|
|
*
|
|
* Local Variables:
|
|
* eval: (c-set-style "gnu")
|
|
* End:
|
|
*/
|