(this is a cherry-picked version of f3b65f67d98a2e67c739d4b76b3340eda1dd06f4,
which got reverted because it depended on my 10.11 frameworks, which were
flawed)
This reverts commit 3a4e2376e444fd7664102af00a34c65b47e271ec.
The reverted commit caused the fix for CVE-2016-9602 not to be applied
for qemu_test because it conflicts with the force-uid0-on-9p.patch.
So with the rebase of the patch on top of the changes of the
CVE-2016-9602.patch, both patches no longer conflict with each other.
I've tested this with the "misc" NixOS test and it succeeds.
Signed-off-by: aszlig <aszlig@redmoonstudios.org>
New upstream patch function and patches for fixing a bug in the patch for
CVE-2017-5667 and the following security issues:
* CVE-2016-7907
* CVE-2016-9602
* CVE-2016-10155
* CVE-2017-2620
* CVE-2017-2630
* CVE-2017-5525
* CVE-2017-5526
* CVE-2017-5579
* CVE-2017-5856
* CVE-2017-5857
* CVE-2017-5987
* CVE-2017-6058
Also:
* provides a bunch of build options
* documents build options config in longDescription
* provides a bunch of predefined packages and documents them some more
* sources' hashes stay the same
Fixes:
* CVE-2017-2615
* CVE-2017-5667
* CVE-2017-5898
* CVE-2017-5931
* CVE-2017-5973
We are vulnerable to even more CVEs but those are either not severe like
memory leaks in obscure situations or upstream hasn't acknowledged the
patch yet.
cc #23072
XSA-197 Issue Description:
> The compiler can emit optimizations in qemu which can lead to double
> fetch vulnerabilities. Specifically data on the rings shared
> between qemu and the hypervisor (which the guest under control can
> obtain mappings of) can be fetched twice (during which time the
> guest can alter the contents) possibly leading to arbitrary code
> execution in qemu.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-197.html
XSA-199 Issue Description:
> The code in qemu which implements ioport read/write looks up the
> specified ioport address in a dispatch table. The argument to the
> dispatch function is a uint32_t, and is used without a range check,
> even though the table has entries for only 2^16 ioports.
>
> When qemu is used as a standalone emulator, ioport accesses are
> generated only from cpu instructions emulated by qemu, and are
> therefore necessarily 16-bit, so there is no vulnerability.
>
> When qemu is used as a device model within Xen, io requests are
> generated by the hypervisor and read by qemu from a shared ring. The
> entries in this ring use a common structure, including a 64-bit
> address field, for various accesses, including ioport addresses.
>
> Xen will write only 16-bit address ioport accesses. However,
> depending on the Xen and qemu version, the ring may be writeable by
> the guest. If so, the guest can generate out-of-range ioport
> accesses, resulting in wild pointer accesses within qemu.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-199.html
XSA-207 Issue Description:
> Certain internal state is set up, during domain construction, in
> preparation for possible pass-through device assignment. On ARM and
> AMD V-i hardware this setup includes memory allocation. On guest
> teardown, cleanup was erroneously only performed when the guest
> actually had a pass-through device assigned.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-207.html
XSA-209 Issue Description:
> When doing bitblt copy backwards, qemu should negate the blit width.
> This avoids an oob access before the start of video memory.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-208.html
XSA-208 Issue Description:
> In CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC mode the bitblit copy routine
> cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo fails to check wethehr the specified memory
> region is safe.
More: https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-209.html
Putting information in external JSON files is IMHO not an improvement
over the idiomatic style of Nix expressions. The use of JSON doesn't
add anything over Nix expressions (in fact it removes expressive
power). And scattering package info over lots of little files makes
packages less readable over having the info in one file.
