351f5fc585
This includes fuse-common (fusePackages.fuse_3.common) as recommended by upstream. But while fuse(2) and fuse3 would normally depend on fuse-common we can't do that in nixpkgs while fuse-common is just another output from the fuse3 multiple-output derivation (i.e. this would result in a circular dependency). To avoid building fuse3 twice I decided it would be best to copy the shared files (i.e. the ones provided by fuse(2) and fuse3) from fuse-common to fuse (version 2) and avoid collision warnings by defining priorities. Now it should be possible to install an arbitrary combination of "fuse", "fuse3", and "fuse-common" without getting any collision warnings. The end result should be the same and all changes should be backwards compatible (assuming that mount.fuse from fuse3 is backwards compatible as stated by upstream [0] - if not this might break some /etc/fstab definitions but that should be very unlikely). My tests with sshfs (version 2 and 3) didn't show any problems. See #28409 for some additional information. [0]: https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/releases/tag/fuse-3.0.0
232 lines
7.5 KiB
Nix
232 lines
7.5 KiB
Nix
{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
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let
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inherit (config.security) wrapperDir wrappers;
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parentWrapperDir = dirOf wrapperDir;
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programs =
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(lib.mapAttrsToList
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(n: v: (if v ? "program" then v else v // {program=n;}))
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wrappers);
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securityWrapper = pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
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name = "security-wrapper";
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phases = [ "installPhase" "fixupPhase" ];
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buildInputs = [ pkgs.libcap pkgs.libcap_ng pkgs.linuxHeaders ];
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hardeningEnable = [ "pie" ];
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installPhase = ''
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mkdir -p $out/bin
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gcc -Wall -O2 -DWRAPPER_DIR=\"${parentWrapperDir}\" \
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-lcap-ng -lcap ${./wrapper.c} -o $out/bin/security-wrapper
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'';
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};
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###### Activation script for the setcap wrappers
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mkSetcapProgram =
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{ program
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, capabilities
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, source
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, owner ? "nobody"
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, group ? "nogroup"
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, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
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, ...
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}:
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assert (lib.versionAtLeast (lib.getVersion config.boot.kernelPackages.kernel) "4.3");
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''
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cp ${securityWrapper}/bin/security-wrapper $wrapperDir/${program}
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echo -n "${source}" > $wrapperDir/${program}.real
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# Prevent races
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chmod 0000 $wrapperDir/${program}
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chown ${owner}.${group} $wrapperDir/${program}
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# Set desired capabilities on the file plus cap_setpcap so
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# the wrapper program can elevate the capabilities set on
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# its file into the Ambient set.
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${pkgs.libcap.out}/bin/setcap "cap_setpcap,${capabilities}" $wrapperDir/${program}
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# Set the executable bit
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chmod ${permissions} $wrapperDir/${program}
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'';
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###### Activation script for the setuid wrappers
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mkSetuidProgram =
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{ program
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, source
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, owner ? "nobody"
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, group ? "nogroup"
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, setuid ? false
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, setgid ? false
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, permissions ? "u+rx,g+x,o+x"
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, ...
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}:
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''
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cp ${securityWrapper}/bin/security-wrapper $wrapperDir/${program}
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echo -n "${source}" > $wrapperDir/${program}.real
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# Prevent races
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chmod 0000 $wrapperDir/${program}
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chown ${owner}.${group} $wrapperDir/${program}
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chmod "u${if setuid then "+" else "-"}s,g${if setgid then "+" else "-"}s,${permissions}" $wrapperDir/${program}
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'';
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mkWrappedPrograms =
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builtins.map
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(s: if (s ? "capabilities")
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then mkSetcapProgram
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({ owner = "root";
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group = "root";
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} // s)
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else if
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(s ? "setuid" && s.setuid) ||
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(s ? "setgid" && s.setgid) ||
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(s ? "permissions")
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then mkSetuidProgram s
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else mkSetuidProgram
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({ owner = "root";
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group = "root";
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setuid = true;
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setgid = false;
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permissions = "u+rx,g+x,o+x";
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} // s)
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) programs;
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in
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{
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###### interface
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options = {
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security.wrappers = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.attrs;
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default = {};
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example = lib.literalExample
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''
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{ sendmail.source = "/nix/store/.../bin/sendmail";
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ping = {
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source = "${pkgs.iputils.out}/bin/ping";
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owner = "nobody";
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group = "nogroup";
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capabilities = "cap_net_raw+ep";
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};
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}
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'';
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description = ''
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This option allows the ownership and permissions on the setuid
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wrappers for specific programs to be overridden from the
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default (setuid root, but not setgid root).
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<note>
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<para>The sub-attribute <literal>source</literal> is mandatory,
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it must be the absolute path to the program to be wrapped.
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</para>
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<para>The sub-attribute <literal>program</literal> is optional and
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can give the wrapper program a new name. The default name is the same
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as the attribute name itself.</para>
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<para>Additionally, this option can set capabilities on a
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wrapper program that propagates those capabilities down to the
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wrapped, real program.</para>
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<para>NOTE: cap_setpcap, which is required for the wrapper
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program to be able to raise caps into the Ambient set is NOT
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raised to the Ambient set so that the real program cannot
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modify its own capabilities!! This may be too restrictive for
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cases in which the real program needs cap_setpcap but it at
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least leans on the side security paranoid vs. too
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relaxed.</para>
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</note>
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'';
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};
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security.wrapperDir = lib.mkOption {
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type = lib.types.path;
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default = "/run/wrappers/bin";
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internal = true;
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description = ''
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This option defines the path to the wrapper programs. It
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should not be overriden.
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'';
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};
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};
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###### implementation
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config = {
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security.wrappers = {
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fusermount.source = "${pkgs.fuse}/bin/fusermount";
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fusermount3.source = "${pkgs.fuse3}/bin/fusermount3";
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};
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boot.specialFileSystems.${parentWrapperDir} = {
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fsType = "tmpfs";
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options = [ "nodev" ];
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};
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# Make sure our wrapperDir exports to the PATH env variable when
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# initializing the shell
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environment.extraInit = ''
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# Wrappers override other bin directories.
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export PATH="${wrapperDir}:$PATH"
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'';
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###### setcap activation script
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system.activationScripts.wrappers =
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lib.stringAfter [ "specialfs" "users" ]
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''
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# Look in the system path and in the default profile for
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# programs to be wrapped.
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WRAPPER_PATH=${config.system.path}/bin:${config.system.path}/sbin
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# Remove the old /var/setuid-wrappers path from the system...
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#
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# TODO: this is only necessary for upgrades 16.09 => 17.x;
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# this conditional removal block needs to be removed after
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# the release.
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if [ -d /var/setuid-wrappers ]; then
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rm -rf /var/setuid-wrappers
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ln -s /run/wrappers/bin /var/setuid-wrappers
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fi
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# Remove the old /run/setuid-wrappers-dir path from the
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# system as well...
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#
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# TODO: this is only necessary for upgrades 16.09 => 17.x;
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# this conditional removal block needs to be removed after
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# the release.
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if [ -d /run/setuid-wrapper-dirs ]; then
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rm -rf /run/setuid-wrapper-dirs
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ln -s /run/wrappers/bin /run/setuid-wrapper-dirs
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fi
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# TODO: this is only necessary for upgrades 16.09 => 17.x;
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# this conditional removal block needs to be removed after
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# the release.
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if readlink -f /run/booted-system | grep nixos-17 > /dev/null; then
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rm -rf /run/setuid-wrapper-dirs
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rm -rf /var/setuid-wrappers
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fi
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# We want to place the tmpdirs for the wrappers to the parent dir.
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wrapperDir=$(mktemp --directory --tmpdir="${parentWrapperDir}" wrappers.XXXXXXXXXX)
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chmod a+rx $wrapperDir
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${lib.concatStringsSep "\n" mkWrappedPrograms}
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if [ -L ${wrapperDir} ]; then
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# Atomically replace the symlink
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# See https://axialcorps.com/2013/07/03/atomically-replacing-files-and-directories/
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old=$(readlink -f ${wrapperDir})
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ln --symbolic --force --no-dereference $wrapperDir ${wrapperDir}-tmp
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mv --no-target-directory ${wrapperDir}-tmp ${wrapperDir}
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rm --force --recursive $old
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else
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# For initial setup
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ln --symbolic $wrapperDir ${wrapperDir}
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fi
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'';
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};
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}
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