Do a refactoring to the CSRF related code, remove most unnecessary functions. Parse the generated token's issue time, regenerate the token every a few minutes.
		
			
				
	
	
		
			99 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			99 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.2 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			Go
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // Copyright 2012 Google Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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| // Copyright 2014 The Macaron Authors
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| // Copyright 2020 The Gitea Authors
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| //
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| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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| // You may obtain a copy of the License at
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| //
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| //     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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| //
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| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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| // limitations under the License.
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| 
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| package context
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| 
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| import (
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| 	"bytes"
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| 	"crypto/hmac"
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| 	"crypto/sha1"
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| 	"crypto/subtle"
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| 	"encoding/base64"
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| 	"fmt"
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| 	"strconv"
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| 	"strings"
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| 	"time"
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| )
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| 
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| // CsrfTokenTimeout represents the duration that XSRF tokens are valid.
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| // It is exported so clients may set cookie timeouts that match generated tokens.
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| const CsrfTokenTimeout = 24 * time.Hour
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| 
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| // CsrfTokenRegenerationInterval is the interval between token generations, old tokens are still valid before CsrfTokenTimeout
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| var CsrfTokenRegenerationInterval = 10 * time.Minute
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| 
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| var csrfTokenSep = []byte(":")
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| 
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| // GenerateCsrfToken returns a URL-safe secure XSRF token that expires in CsrfTokenTimeout hours.
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| // key is a secret key for your application.
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| // userID is a unique identifier for the user.
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| // actionID is the action the user is taking (e.g. POSTing to a particular path).
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| func GenerateCsrfToken(key, userID, actionID string, now time.Time) string {
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| 	nowUnixNano := now.UnixNano()
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| 	nowUnixNanoStr := strconv.FormatInt(nowUnixNano, 10)
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| 	h := hmac.New(sha1.New, []byte(key))
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| 	h.Write([]byte(strings.ReplaceAll(userID, ":", "_")))
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| 	h.Write(csrfTokenSep)
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| 	h.Write([]byte(strings.ReplaceAll(actionID, ":", "_")))
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| 	h.Write(csrfTokenSep)
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| 	h.Write([]byte(nowUnixNanoStr))
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| 	tok := fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", h.Sum(nil), nowUnixNanoStr)
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| 	return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(tok))
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| }
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| 
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| func ParseCsrfToken(token string) (issueTime time.Time, ok bool) {
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| 	data, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(token)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return time.Time{}, false
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	pos := bytes.LastIndex(data, csrfTokenSep)
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| 	if pos == -1 {
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| 		return time.Time{}, false
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| 	}
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| 	nanos, err := strconv.ParseInt(string(data[pos+1:]), 10, 64)
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| 	if err != nil {
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| 		return time.Time{}, false
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| 	}
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| 	return time.Unix(0, nanos), true
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| }
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| 
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| // ValidCsrfToken returns true if token is a valid and unexpired token returned by Generate.
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| func ValidCsrfToken(token, key, userID, actionID string, now time.Time) bool {
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| 	issueTime, ok := ParseCsrfToken(token)
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| 	if !ok {
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| 		return false
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Check that the token is not expired.
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| 	if now.Sub(issueTime) >= CsrfTokenTimeout {
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| 		return false
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	// Check that the token is not from the future.
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| 	// Allow 1-minute grace period in case the token is being verified on a
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| 	// machine whose clock is behind the machine that issued the token.
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| 	if issueTime.After(now.Add(1 * time.Minute)) {
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| 		return false
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	expected := GenerateCsrfToken(key, userID, actionID, issueTime)
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| 
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| 	// Check that the token matches the expected value.
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| 	// Use constant time comparison to avoid timing attacks.
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| 	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(expected)) == 1
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| }
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