ipsec: fix memleaks in ikev2 openssl code

- Need to always free created contexts
- Always pair init with cleanup for older openssl API.

Type: fix
Signed-off-by: Christian E. Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
Change-Id: Ie8840403bcac500c20085d57240401ad39d119f8
(cherry picked from commit 9a5aab34f5)
This commit is contained in:
Christian E. Hopps
2019-09-27 15:24:37 -04:00
committed by Andrew Yourtchenko
parent cb671c3e13
commit 41e96bbc64

View File

@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ ikev2_calc_prf (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, v8 * data)
HMAC_Init_ex (ctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL);
HMAC_Update (ctx, data, vec_len (data));
HMAC_Final (ctx, prf, &len);
HMAC_CTX_free (ctx);
#else
HMAC_CTX_init (&ctx);
HMAC_Init_ex (&ctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL);
@ -354,6 +355,7 @@ ikev2_calc_integr (ikev2_sa_transform_t * tr, v8 * key, u8 * data, int len)
HMAC_Init_ex (hctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL);
HMAC_Update (hctx, (const u8 *) data, len);
HMAC_Final (hctx, r, &l);
HMAC_CTX_free (hctx);
#else
HMAC_CTX_init (&hctx);
HMAC_Init_ex (&hctx, key, vec_len (key), tr->md, NULL);
@ -411,7 +413,9 @@ ikev2_decrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, u8 * data, int len)
/* remove padding */
_vec_len (r) -= r[vec_len (r) - 1] + 1;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free (ctx);
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup (&ctx);
#endif
return r;
@ -441,6 +445,7 @@ ikev2_encrypt_data (ikev2_sa_t * sa, v8 * src, u8 * dst)
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new ();
EVP_EncryptInit_ex (ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, dst /* dst */ );
EVP_EncryptUpdate (ctx, dst + bs, &out_len, src, vec_len (src));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free (ctx);
#else
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init (&ctx);
EVP_EncryptInit_ex (&ctx, tr_encr->cipher, NULL, key, dst /* dst */ );
@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ ikev2_complete_dh (ikev2_sa_t * sa, ikev2_sa_transform_t * t)
int
ikev2_verify_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * sigbuf, u8 * data)
{
int verify;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new ();
#else
@ -713,10 +719,13 @@ ikev2_verify_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * sigbuf, u8 * data)
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
return EVP_VerifyFinal (md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey);
verify = EVP_VerifyFinal (md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_free (md_ctx);
#else
return EVP_VerifyFinal (&md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey);
verify = EVP_VerifyFinal (&md_ctx, sigbuf, vec_len (sigbuf), pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&md_ctx);
#endif
return verify;
}
u8 *
@ -726,6 +735,7 @@ ikev2_calc_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * data)
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new ();
#else
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init (&md_ctx);
#endif
unsigned int sig_len = 0;
u8 *sign;
@ -738,6 +748,7 @@ ikev2_calc_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * data)
sign = vec_new (u8, sig_len);
/* calc sign */
EVP_SignFinal (md_ctx, sign, &sig_len, pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_free (md_ctx);
#else
EVP_SignInit (&md_ctx, EVP_sha1 ());
EVP_SignUpdate (&md_ctx, data, vec_len (data));
@ -746,6 +757,7 @@ ikev2_calc_sign (EVP_PKEY * pkey, u8 * data)
sign = vec_new (u8, sig_len);
/* calc sign */
EVP_SignFinal (&md_ctx, sign, &sig_len, pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&md_ctx);
#endif
return sign;
}