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ipsec: fix AES CBC IV generation (CVE-2022-46397)

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For AES-CBC, the IV must be unpredictable (see NIST SP800-38a Appendix
C). Chaining IVs like is done by ipsecmb and native backends for the
VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_INIT_IV is fully predictable.
Encrypt a counter as part of the message, making the (predictable)
counter-generated IV unpredictable.

Fixes: VPP-2037
Type: fix

Change-Id: If4f192d62bf97dda553e7573331c75efa11822ae
Signed-off-by: Benoît Ganne <bganne@cisco.com>
This commit is contained in:
Benoît Ganne 2022-01-18 15:56:41 +01:00
parent babecb4132
commit 594a4a5129
2 changed files with 28 additions and 5 deletions
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30
src/vnet/ipsec/esp_encrypt.c
View File

@ -201,6 +201,24 @@ esp_get_ip6_hdr_len (ip6_header_t * ip6)
return len;
}
/* IPsec IV generation: IVs requirements differ depending of the
* encryption mode: IVs must be unpredictable for AES-CBC whereas it can
* be predictable but should never be reused with the same key material
* for CTR and GCM.
* We use a packet counter as the IV for CTR and GCM, and to ensure the
* IV is unpredictable for CBC, it is then encrypted using the same key
* as the message. You can refer to NIST SP800-38a and NIST SP800-38d
* for more details. */
static_always_inline void *
esp_generate_iv (ipsec_sa_t * sa, void *payload, int iv_sz)
{
ASSERT (iv_sz >= sizeof (u64));
u64 *iv = (u64 *) (payload - iv_sz);
clib_memset_u8 (iv, 0, iv_sz);
*iv = sa->iv_counter++;
return iv;
}
static_always_inline void
esp_process_ops (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
vnet_crypto_op_t * ops, vlib_buffer_t * b[], u16 * nexts)
@ -463,6 +481,7 @@ esp_encrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
vnet_crypto_op_t *op;
vec_add2_aligned (ptd->crypto_ops, op, 1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES);
vnet_crypto_op_init (op, sa0->crypto_enc_op_id);
void *pkt_iv = esp_generate_iv (sa0, payload, iv_sz);
op->src = op->dst = payload;
op->key_index = sa0->crypto_key_index;
op->len = payload_len - icv_sz;
@ -481,16 +500,19 @@ esp_encrypt_inline (vlib_main_t * vm, vlib_node_runtime_t * node,
op->tag = payload + op->len;
op->tag_len = 16;
u64 *iv = (u64 *) (payload - iv_sz);
nonce->salt = sa0->salt;
nonce->iv = *iv = clib_host_to_net_u64 (sa0->gcm_iv_counter++);
nonce->iv = *(u64 *) pkt_iv;
op->iv = (u8 *) nonce;
nonce++;
}
else
{
op->iv = payload - iv_sz;
op->flags = VNET_CRYPTO_OP_FLAG_INIT_IV;
/* construct zero iv in front of the IP header */
op->iv = pkt_iv - hdr_len - iv_sz;
clib_memset_u8 (op->iv, 0, iv_sz);
/* include iv field in crypto */
op->src -= iv_sz;
op->len += iv_sz;
}
}

3
src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec_sa.h
View File

@ -122,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct
u64 replay_window;
dpo_id_t dpo;
u64 iv_counter;
vnet_crypto_key_index_t crypto_key_index;
vnet_crypto_key_index_t integ_key_index;
vnet_crypto_op_id_t crypto_enc_op_id:16;
@ -161,7 +163,6 @@ typedef struct
/* Salt used in GCM modes - stored in network byte order */
u32 salt;
u64 gcm_iv_counter;
} ipsec_sa_t;
STATIC_ASSERT_OFFSET_OF (ipsec_sa_t, cacheline1, CLIB_CACHE_LINE_BYTES);